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Abstract
Thus far, international climate policy negotiations have failed to produce a global 
policy to mitigate climate change. There is strong evidence that human activi-
ties are driving climate change and that the expected population and economic 
growth in the 21st century will further exacerbate anthropogenic climate forcing. 
The social implications of this make the need for international climate policy 
clear; however, international law presents difficult challenges for such a policy. 
Because obligations cannot be imposed on sovereign nations without their 
consent and there are strong financial incentives to remain outside of a global 
climate policy, it is unlikely that globally synchronized action will begin with 
one all-encompassing agreement. However, the implementation of a carbon tax 
by the United States presents an opportunity for the nation to begin addressing 
its own heavy dependence on fossil fuels and to coerce all nations that export 
goods to the U.S. to tax carbon as well. This is the most viable tool for the U.S. 
and globally to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. should implement a 
carbon tax with border tax adjustments for the carbon content of goods imported 
to the U.S. because it is practical, ethical, and the most effective tool to mitigate 
serious climate change. 
Climatologists strongly agree that human activities are the most sig-
nificant contributing factor to climate change (Doran and Zimmerman 22). 
Since the industrial revolution, humans have emitted increasing amounts of 
greenhouse gases (GHG), substances that contribute to climate change. The 
major GHGs that are considered in climate analyses and policy are carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and halocarbons (Bern-
stein et al. 37). 
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The release of these GHGs has increased global surface temperature 
well beyond the natural baseline that would have been expected from the 
small increase in solar irradiance. Since 1750, radiative forcing, which is the 
relative change in strength of solar irradiance, has increased 2.64 W/m2 from 
increases in atmospheric CO2, CH4, and N2O, and halocarbons. Natural 
increases in solar irradiance have caused a .12 W/m2  increase in radiative 
forcing. The cumulative increases caused a .7°C global surface temperature 
increase in the 20th century. However, accelerated increases of approximately 
.2°C per decade were observed throughout the last three decades of the 20th 
century. A further increase of .2°C was observed in the first decade of the 21st 
century (Bernstein et al. 45). The planet is now as warm as the Holocene max-
imum and is within 1°C of the maximum temperature in the last million years 
(Hansen et al. 14288). Due to the slow climate response, the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that even when emissions are 
stabilized, temperature will continue to increase for up to a century. This is 
particularly worrisome because CO2 concentrations are at their highest level 
in 650,000 years, and possibly the last 20 million years (Canadell et al. 18866).
Sea level rise is consistent with global temperature increase. From 1961 
to 1993, sea level rose at an average of 1.8mm per year. From 1993 to 2003, sea 
level rose an average of 3.1mm per year. Since 1993, thermal expansion, which 
is the physical expansion of the ocean as it warms, has been responsible for 
57 percent of sea level rise. The melting of glaciers and ice sheets has been re-
sponsible for the remainder of sea level rise. The extent of sea level rise in the 
21st century will be dependent on the increases in global surface temperature. 
Estimates are that sea level will increase .2–.6m in the 21st century and con-
tinue to increase thereafter. Due to the slow speed at which heat is transferred 
to the deep ocean, sea levels will continue to rise even after GHG emissions 
are stabilized or reduced. The IPCC estimates that if emissions were stabilized 
at year 2100, thermal expansion would contribute to .3–.8m of sea level rise 
over the following two centuries (Bernstein et al. 46).
There will be serious social implications of climate change in the 21st 
century beyond increased temperatures and higher sea levels. Ecosystem 
services, on which humans depend for food and water supplies, will be dimin-
ished. Global food production potential may decrease after 3°C warming, rela-
tive to temperature at the end of the 20th century, thus potentially creating 
a dangerous population trap. Millions more people will be exposed to annual 
flooding in the densely populated deltas of Africa and Asia. Tropical storms 
will increase in intensity. Meltwater flow from glaciers and snow, on which 
one-sixth of the world population depends, will be reduced. Weather patterns 
will change, redistributing the water supplies that society has built around. 
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Sea level rise will increase groundwater salinization in coastal areas (Bern-
stein et al. 49).
Although the precise impacts on social conditions for such a scenario 
are somewhat unclear, over 100 nations have adopted a global surface tem-
perature warming limit of 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (Bernstein et al. 
49). To have a 75 percent chance of achieving this goal, global emissions from 
2000–2050 must not exceed 1000 gigatons of CO2. 234 Gt CO2 were emitted 
from 2000–2006 (Meinshausen et al. 1158). This presents a problem as devel-
oping nations evolve and enter the world economy because global emissions 
generally track gross world product. From 1970 to 2000, the carbon intensity, 
which is defined at the kg CO2 emitted per dollar of gross world product, 
decreased annually. However, carbon intensity increased from 2000–2006 
(Canadell et al. 18866-18867).
“Generally, poor countries, and poor people in any given country, suf-
fer the most, notwithstanding that the rich countries are responsible for the 
bulk of past emissions” (Stern 31). The social costs and ethical implications 
of remaining in a global climate policy stalemate are unacceptable. Devel-
oped nations have the ethical duty to address climate change; however, to 
have a reasonable probability of limiting warming to 2°C, developing nations 
must develop in a less carbon-intensive way than developed nations have 
already done. 
Global Policy Context
Climate change is regarded as a global public good, which is a type of 
economic activity whose impacts are indivisible and whose influences are felt 
around the world (Stern 27). Global public goods are difficult international 
governance issues. Under the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which still stands 
as international law, no obligations can be imposed on sovereign nations 
without their approval (Nordhaus 28). Current governmental approaches to 
managing global public goods include leaving it to the market (laissez-faire), 
aspirational or non-binding agreements, binding treaties between individual 
nations, agreements embedded in broader international institutions such as 
multilateral trade negotiations, and delegations of fiscal authority such as the 
World Trade Organization. None of these mechanisms have the breadth to 
truly address climate change because none can force or coerce all countries to 
limit emissions (Nordhaus 29). 
Because most approaches to international climate policy aim to make 
emitting carbon more expensive, and every nation’s economy is based around 
fossil fuels to an extent, there is a large incentive to free-ride: to opt out of 
the global climate policy. In the advent of an international climate policy that 
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does not include every country, free-riding countries would become compara-
tively cheaper places to do business. This would result in carbon leakage, the 
movement of emissions to countries outside climate policy (Di Maria and van 
der Werf 55-56).
Global cap-and-trade and an internationally-harmonized carbon tax are 
the two most likely candidates for a global climate policy. Both options at-
tempt to internalize the externality of carbon emissions to correct the market 
failure that is climate change.
Cap-and-trade is a market-based, quantity-oriented mechanism, which 
sets a cap or binding limit on carbon emissions. Prospective emitters must 
purchase allowances, which are emission rights, to emit. By forcing emitters 
to purchase emission rights, cap-and-trade puts a price on carbon emissions. 
This internalizes the externality of carbon emissions and creates a financial 
incentive to reduce emissions. The regulating institution decides where to 
implement cap-and-trade in the carbon stream—the fossil fuel production 
process. Upstream implementation is near fuel refinement and downstream 
implementation is near to final consumers. Administrative costs multiply 
downstream because of the larger number of entities to regulate (Hsu 20-22; 
Stern 353).
There has been one attempt at global cap-and-trade—the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Kyoto failed at reducing global emissions because it did not include 
enough of the world’s emissions and had an offset program that was abused—
the Clean Development Mechanism. 
The most well-known system that is also most applicable for com-
parison is the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), which 
accounts for 40 percent of the European Union’s emissions by forcing 11,500 
power utilities and industrial emitters to purchase emission allowances. It was 
implemented in 2005 and has operated as an emissions reduction mechanism 
since 2008 (Nordhaus 26-27). The main problems with the EU ETS are price 
volatility and that it has failed to reduce EU emissions (Wilensky 27). 
International implementation of cap-and-trade would require the 
creation of a prohibitively complicated global regulatory agency that would 
establish national emission caps and operate the allowance trading system. 
National caps would be based, to some extent, on countries’ historical emis-
sions. This makes cap-and-trade hugely unpopular with developing nations. 
China and India have both flatly refused to participate in a global quantity-
oriented mechanism. Because their economies are rapidly expanding as they 
develop, both countries argue that by basing their emissions cap on historical 
emissions they will be put at a disadvantage (Hsu 192). Any international 
agreement without both China and India in accord is doomed to fail to 
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achieve its foremost goal of reducing emissions. Even the United Nations has 
been unsuccessful at introducing discussion about quantity-oriented policies 
because developing countries refuse to participate. Furthermore, at the 2009 
UN Climate Change Conference (UNCCC), the world’s 17 largest emitters, 
most of whom are developed nations, could not reach an agreement on any 
binding emission cap. Even if developing countries were to participate in 
talks, establishment of a global emission cap is extremely unlikely (Nordhaus 
26; Stern 497). Without an emission cap, global cap-and-trade will never exist. 
Under the Westphalian system, the market-based, price-oriented mech-
anism of the carbon tax is the most effective and likely candidate for a world-
wide climate policy. A carbon tax is a tax on fossil fuels that can be levied at 
any point in production or distribution. Under a carbon tax, countries would 
be free to levy the tax where they please in the carbon stream, from the load-
ing of coal into a train car to the purchase of fuel by an individual consumer. 
However, upstream levy is by far the cheapest (Metcalf and Weisbach 501).
An internationally harmonized carbon tax is a simple agreement under 
which countries price carbon at an internationally accepted price. It would 
create a level economic playing field while also valuing carbon. From an 
economic stance, valuing carbon internalizes the externality of greenhouse 
emissions by creating a financial incentive to emit less. Trade would be 
unimpeded between countries which operate under a harmonized carbon tax; 
however, for free-riding countries that operate outside of the tax, border tax 
adjustments can reduce or eliminate leakage while also creating a financial 
incentive to join the harmonized carbon tax (Metcalf and Weisbach 502). 
In this context, border tax adjustments would be levied on imported 
goods based on the carbon emissions from the production of that item. Border 
tax adjustments reduce leakage by removing the financial advantage to 
produce goods outside taxed countries. It is unlikely that carbon tax rebates 
would be legal under international trade laws. Because of this, industries that 
export carbon-intensive goods would be disadvantaged; however, border taxes 
create a revenue incentive against free-riding. 
Carbon taxes generate revenue. When a border tax is levied it only 
creates revenue for the importing country. This puts the exporting country at 
a disadvantage and creates an incentive to levy a carbon tax, especially in the 
case of large exporters such as China. The comparative ease of international 
negotiations puts the carbon tax at an advantage to an international cap-and-
trade system (Stern 362; Nordhaus 35; Metcalf and Weisbach 540-541).
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U.S. Climate Policy
Despite some industry support and the possibility of political palatabil-
ity, the previously proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(ACESA) shows that the U.S. has not learned the lessons of the EU ETS. The 
act proposed a U.S. cap-and-trade system was to be implemented mid-carbon 
stream and offered large numbers of free allowances. Had the bill passed, it 
is unlikely that it would have reduced emissions; however, it is likely that it 
would have slowed emissions growth (Wilensky 27). 
Like the EU ETS, the ACESA proposed that power utilities and large 
industrial emitters should buy emission allowances, necessitating the creation 
of a complex national administrative system and the participation of each 
individual entity in allowance auctions. In the American system, however, 
this exposed the bill directly to pressures of industry lobbyists (Wilensky 27). 
President Barack Obama was forced to back down after proposing a system of 
100 percent auctions. The evidence of politicking is clear. The bill included 35 
percent free allowances for electric utilities, 15 percent for energy-intensive 
industries, and 9 percent for natural gas distributers (Hsu 61).
It is highly unlikely that a U.S. cap-and-trade system produced by 
Washington will be strong enough to make serious emission reductions. Fur-
thermore, even if it were designed to mimic a carbon tax by upstream imple-
mentation with border tax adjustments for goods, it would be more costly to 
administer and would be subject to some degree of price volatility.
An upstream U.S. carbon tax with border tax adjustments and neu-
tralization of existing fossil fuel incentives is the best climate policy for the 
U.S. By taxing natural gas as it enters distribution pipelines, coal as it is 
mined and imported, and petroleum at refineries, 80 percent of U.S. GHG 
emissions would be taxed while only 3,000 entities would be taxed directly. 
Approximately 90 percent coverage of U.S. emissions could be achieved with 
a relatively small additional expense by also including cement plants and the 
transmission and storage of natural gas. Even 80 percent coverage is signifi-
cantly higher than the coverage of any climate policy in existence. By creating 
a level economic playing field based solely on carbon content, a broad U.S. 
carbon tax with border tax adjustments would create a true market for carbon 
and efficiently internalize carbon emission externalities to most activities in 
the U.S. This would incentivize changes away from fossil fuels, leading to re-
duction in use and efficiency improvements. A carbon tax also raises revenue, 
which could be used for limited tax-related job loss compensation and govern-
ment subsidy (Metcalf and Weisbach 527-528).
Border tax adjustments based on the carbon content of the goods being 
imported remove the financial incentive for countries outside the U.S. to 
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increase production of goods that carbon taxation makes more expensive in 
the U.S. Thus the terms of trade effect is minimized and U.S. emission reduc-
tions are not offset.  Economic distortions and the resulting emission leakage 
between industries within the U.S. will also be minimized because of broad 
coverage of taxation (Di Maria and van der Werf 56; Nordhaus 35). 
The goal of energy independence gives the U.S. an advantage in terms 
of carbon leakage via the energy market effect, which is the substitution of 
fossil fuels for other sources because of the cost reduction of fossil fuels. As 
of 2011, the U.S. was a net energy exporter. By levying border taxes equal to 
its carbon tax and maintaining a carbon tax rate equal to or greater than the 
global price reduction of fossil fuels, the U.S. has the ability to offset the en-
ergy market effect while also creating a revenue incentive for other fossil fuel 
exporters to tax carbon. The disadvantage of this policy is that it may put the 
U.S. fossil fuel industry at a competitive disadvantage; however, if the revenue 
incentive works and other fossil fuel exporters implement carbon taxation, 
this will be negated.  Because tax rebates are not allowed by international law, 
the U.S. fossil fuel industry will be disadvantaged regardless of the carbon tax 
rate policy (Metcalf and Weisbach  547).
Setting the carbon tax rate, which is defined as dollars per ton of CO2, 
is a challenging issue. There are two approaches. The first, called the Pigou-
vian approach, is to set the carbon tax rate equal to the marginal damages 
that CO2 causes, which is the social and environmental cost in dollars. Even 
economists do not agree on how to calculate marginal damages. For example, 
the IPCC supports a carbon tax of $12 per metric ton, yet acknowledges that 
there are estimates from $3 to $95 (Metcalf and Weisbach 511). 
This approach is flawed because it assumes that the market knows 
the optimal level of emissions. This is based on the imperfect but widely 
used theory of Pareto Optimality, which states that a properly functioning 
market will move towards a position in which no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off. The fundamental problem of Pareto 
Optimality is that the optimal market position is determined by initial con-
ditions (Freeman 320). The implication of this for U.S. climate policy is that 
the optimal market position will be heavily influenced by current emissions, 
which are 80 percent fossil fuel combustion emissions. This will limit the 
effectiveness of a carbon tax.
The preferable second approach mimics a cap-and-trade system by 
setting the tax rate to achieve an acceptable level of GHG emissions. The 
emission level should be determined by climate science and public debate so 
that impacts of future climate change can be better predicted and adaptation 
planned. Even if the U.S. were to successfully implement a carbon tax and 
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reduce its emissions, the global impact on emissions would be relatively small 
in the face of burgeoning economies in Africa, South America, and Asia. 
However, as the world’s largest single-nation economy, the U.S. has the ability 
to coerce other nations to tax carbon at the same rate, thereby harmonizing 
carbon taxes. The revenue incentive is the mechanism by which the U.S. could 
do this. Even if the border tax incentive fails to coerce governments to imple-
ment a carbon tax, it would still serve as an incentive to reduce emissions and, 
because the tax would generate revenue, fund research on GHG emission-
reducing technologies.
It is clear that human activities are driving climate change and that the 
effects will be overwhelmingly negative, especially for those least responsible 
for historical GHG emissions. The stalemate of international climate negotia-
tion and the reasonable refusal of China and India to take part in a quantity-
oriented global policy leave a globally harmonized carbon tax as the only 
plausible option. However, there is no global carbon tax. Although it would 
be highly unpopular, the U.S. should implement a carbon tax with border tax 
adjustments to coerce other nations into a harmonized carbon tax system. 
It is the most practical way to limit GHG emissions nationally and foster an 
international market for carbon. Implementation is the most ethical decision 
given the lack of international policy options.
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